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URBAN CENTERS IN OROMIA:
CONSEQUENCES OF SPATIAL  




This paper examines the essence and characteris-tics of cities and urban centers in Oromia (see maps 1 and 2) and the major consequences of 
the centralization and spatial concentration of Habasha 
(Amhara-Tigray) political power in a multinational 
Ethiopia. It speci!cally demonstrates how the integration 
of indigenous Oromo towns into the Ethiopian colonial 
structure and the formation of garrison and non-garrison 
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cities and towns in Oromia consolidated Habasha politi-
cal domination over the Oromo people. #e Ethiopian 
colonial structure limited the access of Oromo urban res-
idents, who are a minority in their own cities and towns, 
to institutions and opportunities, such as employment, 
education, health, mass media and other public services. 
In addition to exclusion, the Oromos have been prevented 
from developing autonomous institutions, organizations, 
culture, and language, and have been subordinated to the 
institutions and organizations of the Habasha colonial 
settlers in their own cities, towns, and homeland.
#e issues of the Oromo urbanites cannot be suf-
!ciently explained without locating them within larger 
problems of the colonization of Oromia by the alliance 
of Ethiopian settler colonialism and global imperialism. 
#is paper explores four interrelated issues: First, it out-
lines methodological and theoretical narratives. Second, 
the paper speci!cally explains the evolution of indig-
enous Oromo urban centers and their integration into 
the Ethiopian colonial structure and the development of 
garrison and non-garrison cities and towns in Oromia. 
#ird, it identi!es and examines the major consequences 
of the spatial concentration of Amhara-Tigray political 
power in the Oromo and Habasha urban communi-
ties in Oromia. Finally, the paper explains the features 
of Oromian urban communities, the process of urban 
underdevelopment, and the e$ects of political repression 
and state terrorism on the Oromos.
Methodological and Theoretical 
Narratives
Addressing the major consequences of the spatial 
concentration of Habasha political power in the heart 
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of Oromian cities and urban centers is a di%cult and 
complex task because of the paucity of adequate data1 
and the methodological and theoretical challenges one 
faces due to the problem of dealing with the two con-
tradictory worlds of the Oromos and Habashas that are 
interconnected and geographically located in the hearts 
of Oromia. Historical and comparative methods are 
used to address the root problems and the contradic-
tions between the Oromo and Habasha communities in 
Oromian cities and urban centers by locating them in the 
regional and global political economy. #ese methods 
assist us in exploring the historical origins and develop-
ment of pre-colonial and colonial towns in Oromia, and 
to historically situate, compare, and contrast the quality 
of life for Oromo and Amhara-Tigray communities in 
Oromian cities and urban centers.
#is study uses critical, re-interpretative, com-
parative, and integrative modes of analyses. By using 
an integrative and critical theoretical framework, this 
research interconnects structural, cultural and behav-
ioral approaches to explain the processes of policy for-
mation and political action in order to determine why 
there are di$erential qualities of life and public services 
in the colonized and colonizing urban communities. Pri-
marily structural approaches are rooted in Marxian and 
Weberian modes of analyses that focus on the impact of 
socio-economic relations in shaping political structures 
and policies (see DiGaetano and Storm 2003, Skocpol 
1973). Structural analysts are concerned with “histori-
cally rooted and materially based processes of distribu-
tion, con&ict, power, and domination, thought to drive 
social order and social change” (Lichbach 1997, 248). 
#e political economy approach, as one aspect of struc-
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tural modes of analyses, helps in identifying and explain-
ing chains of factors that facilitate large-scale and long-
term social, cultural, political, and economic changes. 
Analysts who adopt the political economy approach 
assume that “the most signi!cant processes shaping 
human identities, interests, and interaction are such 
large-scale features of modernity as capitalist develop-
ment, market rationality, state-building, secularization, 
political and scienti!c revolution, and the acceleration 
of instruments for the communication and di$usions of 
ideas” (Katznelson 1997, 83).
#e structural or political economy approach does 
not adequately explain the behavioral and institutional 
forms of the Ethiopian colonial elites and state struc-
tures. Cultural analysis of political systems however 
can be used to explain the behavioral and institutional 
forms of the colonizing structure. #is analytic approach 
provides assistance in understanding the basic values, 
symbols and belief systems that provide “a system of 
meaning that people use to manage their daily worlds, 
large and small; . . . culture is the basis and political iden-
tity that a$ects how people line up and how they act 
on wide range of matters” (Ross 1997, 42). According 
to Alan DiGaetano and Elizabeth Strom (2003, 360), 
“culture is linked to governance by ideological construc-
tions through which participants in the political process 
interpret local events. Such ideological orientations also 
provide the core values upon which policy decisions are 
made.” C. Stone (1989, 6) notes that governments are 
based on “the informal arrangements by which public 
bodies and private interests function together in order to 
be able to make and carry out governing decisions.”
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#rough integrating the structural context, political 
culture, and political behavior in complex sets of relations 
and networks that DiGaetano and Strom (2003, 263) 
call “the institutional milieus,” we can explore the impact 
of the Ethiopian colonial institutions in general and gar-
rison cities and towns in particular on the Oromo urban-
ites. According to DiGaetano and Strom (2003, 263), 
Institutional milieus are the complexes of 
formal and informal political and governmental 
arrangements that mediate interactions among 
the structural contexts, political culture, and 
political actors. Formal institutional arrange-
ments . . . include the governmental bodies . . . 
and partnerships that give visible form to urban 
governance through rules and organization. 
Modes of governance [emphasis in original] are 
the informal arrangements that de!ne the gov-
erning relationships among and within formal 
institutions implicated in urban politics. 
#e integration of structural, cultural, and behavioral 
theoretical approaches is necessary to examine critically 
the situations of Oromo and Habasha communities in 
Oromian cities and urban centers. 
Pre-colonial Urban Centers  
in Oromia
#is section explains the evolution of indigenous 
Oromo urban centers, and how these centers became the 
centers of Ethiopian colonial institutions and were used to 
dominate, control and exploit the Oromo people. Urban 
centers developed in pre-colonial Oromia because of the 
development of the division of labor and the emergence 
Journal of  Oromo Studies
44
of internal contradictions in Oromo society. Pre-colonial 
Oromia had a small number of urban centers because 
of the egalitarian political economy of Oromo society 
which was similar to what Karl Polanyi (1944, 47-48) 
calls “reciprocity and redistribution.” Urban centers and 
cities emerged in class-based societies: “Without a central 
power and a mechanism to generate a surplus over con-
sumption and to concentrate it into urban areas, cities 
cannot grow” (Gilbert and Gugler 1995, 14). Historian 
Tesema Ta’a (1994, 678) asserts that in Western Oromia, 
the major factors for the development of towns in the 
!rst half of the nineteenth century were “further consoli-
dation and centralization of the administration, exten-
sion of resource base, increase in agricultural production 
and the &ourishing of trade.” #e development of settled 
agriculture and the production of surplus food and other 
materials and trade networks “release a portion of the 
people from tasks of providing the elemental necessities 
of life” (see Johnson 1972, 1-2).
#e transformation of pastoral modes of life into 
mixed and settled agriculture, the availability of surplus 
food and wealth, the processes of class di$erentiation 
and status group formation, the emergence of hereditary 
leaders by replacing democratic leaders, and the develop-
ment of marketplaces with networks of local and long 
distance trade gradually led to the emergence of indig-
enous towns in Western Oromia (Ta’a 1994; Gemeda 
1987; Tadasse 1983). #e hereditary Leeqaa kingdoms 
“developed and consolidated their political power using 
better military organization, forging e$ective alliances, 
controlling local economic resources and dominating 
the long-distance trade as well as the main market vil-
lages” (Ta’a 1994, 676). #e town of Naqamte2 emerged 
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in this process. Before the emergence of Naqamte, the 
gadaa government was centered in Komtoo. At that 
time Naqamte was a qabiyyee of the Kolobo clan. Bakare 
acquired Handaq when he was elected as the abba duulaa 
of the Mananya’a and moved his residence to Waacha, 
close to his new estate a+er dislodging Fido Bokisa. 
Naqamte grew around this locale. 
Naqamte gradually developed into a central market-
place where the people would exchange their products. 
Long distance caravan merchants frequently traveled to 
Naqamte in search of gold and ivory. #e !rst monar-
chical leader of the Leeqaa Naqamte, Bakare Godana 
established a hereditary local Oromo kingdom of 
Leeqaa, ruling approximately between 1841 and 1868, 
Map 1: Oromia in the 1850s
Source: Mitchell, S. Augustus A System of Modern Geography 
(Philadelphia: J.H. Butler and Company, 1875).
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by destroying the Oromo democratic system of adminis-
tration. He developed Naqamte into a permanent place 
and town. As soon as Bakare Godana “was elected as the 
abba duulaa [war leader] of the Na’a lineage group, [he] 
immediately started to ignore the basic tenets of the cus-
tomary gadaa rules and regulations and [undermined] 
the superior powers of the abba boku [the main leader]. 
He gathered many followers and organized them into 
an e$ective [strike] force and entered into repeated con-
&icts with Fido Bokkisa, the contemporary abba boku” 
(Ta’a 1994, 677).
Bakare forced Fido Bokkisa to &ee, controlling areas 
around Naqamte, such as Waacha.3 Bakare established 
this settlement and consolidated his political and social 
organization by recruiting permanent body guards and 
soldiers. When he died in 1868, about 2000 people lived 
around Naqamte (Ta’a 1994, 678). #e development and 
enlargement of Naqamte continued under the adminis-
tration of his successors Moroda Bakare (r. 1868-1889) 
and Kumsa Moroda (1889-1923). It was during Kumsa’s 
administration that European travelers, merchants, and 
a few Ethiopians visited Naqamate and provided eyewit-
ness accounts on the town. During the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, Weld Blundel (1900, 13), a British 
traveler, noted that “Nakamte is a large scattered town 
of some 40,000 inhabitants, situated on an undulating 
ground, with all the evidence of prosperity. All kinds of 
produce corn and honey being principal and large quan-
tities of cotton . . . iron and copper metal from the west 
are to be seen in the market.” Another traveler, Hugues 
Le Roux (1902, 310-311), a French traveler, was amazed 
by the buildings in Naqamte and their various shapes 
and sizes. He witnessed that “a high density of popula-
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tion living in compact villages in and around” the city 
(quoted in Ta’a 1994, 680). C.W. Major Gwynn (1937) 
admired how Naqamte was &ourishing. Further, E.J. 
Bartleet (1934, 65) described how this city had com-
mercial networks with Gojjam, Shawa, Bella Shangul, 
the Sudan, and Dembi Dollo, and had developed into 
an important and prosperous city. Adrien Zervos (1936, 
397-399) described that because Naqamte was a very sig-
ni!cant commercial center about seventy foreign mer-
chants established import-export agencies in the city. 
#e foreign merchants included Indians, Greeks, Leba-
nese, Armenians, Americans, and Arabs. #e Swedish 
Evangelical Missionaries also opened a church, a hos-
pital, and an elementary school in the city. #ere were 
indigenous settlements and towns similar to Nagamte 
in other parts of Oromia. Towns like Saqa, Jimma, Billo, 
Assandabo, Dappo, and Dembi Dollo developed during 
the nineteenth century.
South of Naqamte, Saqa emerged as the seat of the 
ruler of Limmu and as a local market in the early nine-
teenth century. As a center of commerce, Saqa was con-
nected to Kafa and other Oromo kingdoms, Gojjam, 
and Gondar (Gemeda 1987, 30). #e population of this 
city was estimated between ten and twelve thousand. 
Saqa declined in the late nineteenth century because 
of the weakening of the kingdom of Limmu and the 
emergence of other settlements and towns like Jimma 
and Billo (Gemeda 1987, 30). During the second half 
of the nineteenth century, Billo emerged as a main mar-
ketplace between the Gibe region and Gojjam. Several 
caravan merchants visited Billo and passed through it. 
Another important city was Jimma, the city that evolved 
from Hirmata and Jiren (see Map 2) settlements in the 
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middle of the nineteenth century as the commercial and 
administrative center of the Oromo kingdom of Jimma 
(Gemeda 1987, 32). Abba Jifar I (c. 1830-1854) selected 
Jiren as the political capital of his kingdom and his main 
mesera (residence), and Hirmata as the main market 
(Gaba Gi%i) of his kingdom. While merchants lived in 
Hirmata, the mootti (King), his family, and followers 
lived in Jiren. 
European travelers, such as Soleillet, Jules Borelli, Leo-
poldo Traversi, and Alexander Bulatovich (2000) stayed 
in Jiren at the court of the King. Later, Mendera emerged 
as the main residential area of the merchants and their 
agents; the merchants and their agents who were living in 
Mendera in 1911 included Dubail, a Swiss; Guingnions, a 
French; and Ydlibi, a Syrian (Gemeda 1987, 33). Further, 
Indian, Arab, and American merchants opened shops for 
their agents in the 1920s in Mendera. 
Another urban center that emerged in the late nine-
teenth century was Dembi Dollo; this town also evolved 
from a marketplace. A+er struggling with its competitors, 
such as Abba Ghimbi, Abba Dassa and Burayu, Jote Tulu 
of Gidami brought Dembi Dollo under his administra-
tion (Tadasse 1983). A+er the death of Jote in 1918, 
Leeqaa Qellem and Sayyoo fell under the direct control 
of the Abyssinian colonial administration, and Habasha 
settlers began to arrive and establish the nafxayna-gabbar 
system. #e expropriation of Oromo lands by Ethiopian 
colonial settlers, and the intensi!cation of taxation, and 
the inability of Oromos to pay heavy taxes forced many of 
them to migrate to Dembi Dollo in search of jobs, such as 
porterage (Tadasse 1983, 26). #e Greeks introduced new 
ways of constructing houses; sawmills; the knowledge of 
making blocks of sandstone; production of various fruits 
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and crops, such as rice, mangoes, bananas, oranges, apri-
cots, etc.; sewing and sewing machines; bakeries; hotels; 
cheese making; and so forth. #ere were also other Euro-
peans and Americans who introduced some innovations 
to the city of Dembi Dollo. #ere was an Italian sawmill 
in 1919 near Dembi Dollo. #e Italian Catholic mission 
built sawmills in Sakko to the west of Dembi Dollo. #e 
American mission was established in 1919 and built a 
school, a hospital, and churches. Both the American and 
Catholic Italian missions introduced a modern education, 
health care, and Christianity to Dembi Dollo. 
Land alienation and heavy land taxes forced Oromos 
to seek employment with Greek merchants, and poor 
Oromos became porters to transport goods between 
Dembi Dollo and Gambella. #e !rst missionaries were 
medical doctors who combined religious gospel and 
medicine; they trained Oromo teachers and preachers to 
spread the Christian gospel among the Oromo commu-
nity of the region. #ere are other pre-conquest Oromian 
cities that are not included in this paper due to lack of data. 
A+er Oromia was e$ectively colonized by the Habasha, 
indigenous Oromo urban centers were converted into gar-
rison towns and became the center of the Ethiopian colo-
nial administration. In these processes Oromos became 
a numerical and political minority in their own urban 
centers and culturally and economically subordinated to 
Habasha communities as we will see below.
The Development Garrison and non-
Garrison Towns 
#e chains of factors that facilitated the develop-
ment of both garrison and non-garrison cities and towns 
(see Map 2) included capitalist penetration; Abyssinian 
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colonial expansion, including the need to control strate-
gic centers and the caravan trade as well as natural and 
human resources; the introduction of innovations, such 
as the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line (see Map 2); 
and modern transportation and communication systems 
(see Benti 1988, 2000; Jalata 1993; Koehn and Koehn 
1979). Alan Gilbert and Josef Gugler (1995, 16) note 
that “without the intrusion of industrial capitalism and 
imperialism some #ird World societies would still lack 
major cities. In major parts of America and Africa urban 
development was superimposed by capitalism on essen-
tially rural areas.” Just as European colonialists founded 
cities that re&ected their power structures and protected 
their interests in their colonies, the Ethiopian colonial-
ists created or developed urban centers and cities that 
they used for colonial domination and surplus extraction 
from Oromia. Gilbert and Gugler (1995, 18) correctly 
characterize such cities and urban centers as an “instru-
ment of conquest.” 
#e Ethiopian colonial settlers created garrison 
towns and cities known as katamas in strategically and 
politically secured regions and brought the existing 
Oromo urban centers under their control. John Murray 
(1922, 35) points that “Convinced that much more 
was to be made out of the helpless Galla [Oromo] by 
their permanent exploitation, he [Menelik] began . . . 
to occupy the districts that he overran with permanent 
garrisons of his troops, providing at the same time for 
their administration under a hierarchy of his own o%-
cials.” Initially, Menelik, the founder of the Ethiopian 
Empire, developed garrison towns, such as Ankobar, 
Dabra Berhan, and Angolala in the mid-nineteenth 
century; the last was burned by the Oromo in 1868, 
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Map 2: Railway Towns and Garrison Towns
Source: Akalou Wolde-Michael, “Urban Development in Ethio-
pia, (1889-1925) Early Phase,” $e Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 
vol. Xi, no., 1 (1973), p. 1.
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but recovered by Menelik. He also developed Leche, 
Feqre Gimb, Enaware, Tamo, and Warra Illu. Similarly, 
Yohannes founded Dase in northern Oromia in 1883. 
Menelik consolidated his garrison town of Warra Illu 
(see Map 2) in Wallo, northern Oromia, in 1870 and 
installed 40,000 soldiers there (Pankhurst 1985, 226); in 
the same year, the Wallo Oromo attacked and destroyed 
it. #ere were several Europeans at the re-created Warra 
Illu garrison town in 1879. #e Wallo Oromo set !re to 
this town again and destroyed it in the same year.
Northern Oromia (north of Addis Ababa, see Map 
3) gradually fell into Ethiopian hands. A+er bringing 
this strategically and politically signi!cant region under 
his control, Menelik turned his attention to the Tulama 
Oromo who were residents of Fin!nnee (currently Addis 
Ababa, see maps 1 and 2) and its surroundings (see Map 
1). With the further colonization of the Oromo, the 
building of more katamas became essential. Richard 
Pankhurst (1977, 231) comments that “the desire to 
exercise more e$ective control over the Oromo . . . led 
Menilek [sic] in the latter part of 1878 to move further 
to the mountain of Wacaca where he dug the foundations 
for a new town.” He named this garrison town Entoto 
(later called Old Entoto). In 1882, Menelik transferred 
his settlement to a strategically and politically impor-
tant place called Dildila and later named New Entoto. 
#ese settlements were created by evacuating or enslav-
ing the Oromo living there (Pankhurst 1977, 232). A+er 
strengthening his army and accumulating massive !re-
arms, Menelik built Addis Ababa, on the place known 
by the Oromo name Fin!nnee, between 1886 and 1887 
without primary consideration of strategy. Addis Ababa 
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emerged as the capital city of the Ethiopian Empire in 
the heart of Oromia.
 #e major portion of Oromo land on which this 
capital city was founded was owned by thirty-one 
Ethiopian o%cials (Pankhurst 1985, 204). #e army 
commanders were given a large plots of lands on which 
they established their respective camps for their relatives, 
followers, and war captives (Benti 2000, 64). While 
most Oromos were evicted and forced to migrate to 
far places, others were permanently marginalized and 
turned into servants and laborers (Benti 2000, 278). 
Some Europeans and others had obtained Oromo 
lands from Menelik before the merchandization of land 
by giving him gi+s. However, by the proclamation of 
October 27, 1907, Oromo land became a commodity 
to be sold and bought. #is proclamation “gave Ethio-
pian and foreign [European] landlords a great deal more 
security of tenure” (Garretson 1974, 116). Some of these 
Europeans bought tracts of land and built their houses, 
shops, and o%ces. Making Addis Ababa the center of 
commerce, bureaucracy, and employment, the Ethiopian 
government attracted people from di$erent parts of the 
world and Abyssinia proper to this city while the Oromo 
people were marginalized, segregated, and dehumanized 
in rural and urban areas alike. #e people in the city 
mainly obtained their food and income from the sur-
rounding Oromos; military commanders, soldiers, fol-
lowers depended on the tribute and tax mainly collected 
from the Oromo people (Benti 2000, 54). 
Gradually, Addis Abba gained regional and interna-
tional importance. Several continental and international 
organizations made this capital city their center without 
recognizing the existence and su$ering of the Oromo 
Journal of  Oromo Studies
54
people. Most countries opened their embassies and non-
governmental agencies in Addis Ababa without consider-
ing the interest of the Oromo people. International mer-
chants from Europe, Asia, and Arabia migrated to and 
dominated commercial activities in Addis Ababa and 
major towns. In 1899, there were three important shops 
in Addis Ababa; these were owned and operated by three 
French merchants (Pankhurst 1967, 53). Indian, Greek, 
Arab, and Armenian merchants became dominant in 
trade. #ese merchants expanded their operations to 
provincial towns. #ese non-African merchants “com-
bined import-export businesses which were very prof-
itable” (Pankhurst 1968, 399). Legesse Lemma (1979, 
106) asserts that “West Europeans, mainly French and 
British, were engaged in high !nance and international 
trade, while Arabs, Armenians, Indians and Greeks par-
ticipated in relatively small-scale commerce.” 
Addis Ababa was established at the crossroads of 
important trade routes from south to north and from 
east to west. It became the hub of the trade routes to 
Assab, Djibouti, Zeila, and Berbera, the Sudan through 
Wallaga, Gojjam, Ankobar, and Gondar, to Wallo and 
Massawa, and to Gambella. #ese routes connected the 
Ethiopian Empire with the British, Italian, and French 
colonies that completely surrounded it. With the cen-
tralization of Ethiopian power and the control of the 
market system, the colonialists bene!tted from trade 
at community, regional, and central levels and strictly 
administered marketplaces to collect taxes and customs 
duties. While Ethiopians, Europeans, and others had 
representatives in Addis Ababa city a$airs and “shared 
certain privileges of accessibility to and protection of 
the Emperor,” the Oromos were placed under direct 
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Ethiopian military rule (Garretson, 1974, 168-183). By 
granting concessions to European capitalists, the state 
introduced modern innovations, such as a railway, a few 
roads, a telephone and telegraph system, a postal system, 
a bank, the !rst modern school, and the !rst hospital.
By establishing his court in Fin!nnee (Addis Ababa), 
Menelik “directed the administration . . . and governed 
the newly conquered Galla country [Oromia] and his 
acquisitions through the military o%cers in charge of 
the garrisons of his own troops, whom he could appoint 
and dismiss at his pleasure” (Murray 1922, 41). About 
Oromia and other colonized regions, Harold Marcus 
(1971, 165) says this: “Not only were these territories 
e$ectively occupied and policed, but they were also being 
economically and politically integrated into . . . Ethio-
pia.” #e colonization of Oromia, the development of 
the transportation and communication systems, and the 
establishment of Addis Ababa and garrison towns facili-
tated the development of the Ethiopian institutional 
milieu and created “the integrating nucleus of the colo-
nial economic system” (Althabe 1964, 1-3) in Oromia 
with the collusion of the capitalist world economy. 
Commodities and food products produced by Oromo 
labor &owed to and were concentrated in Addis Ababa 
and other urban centers for local consumption and 
international markets. According to Gilbert and Gugler 
(1995, 15), “the development of the world economy . . . 
created an interlinked economic system [in which] dif-
ferent cities perform the roles allocated to them within 
that system.”
#e Abyssinian colonial settlers also built garrison 
towns like Gore, Jijiga, Asaba Teferi, Assala, Goba, and 
others in Oromia (see map, p. 3). #ese forti!ed settle-
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ments had strong connections among themselves and 
with Addis Ababa in order to assist one another during 
emergencies. Although these towns were very backward 
compared to the European towns built in other parts of 
Africa during the colonial period, “the colonial struc-
ture . . . created a very special type of town: the centre 
of trade in goods and of colonial power, the town is the 
re&ection, both economic and sociological, of colonial 
domination” (Althabe 1964, 3). Since there was no color 
line between the colonizer and the colonized peoples, 
as between Europeans and Africans, many scholars have 
failed to understand this colonial situation. #e garri-
son towns gradually evolved into the major geopolitical 
centers for practicing political domination, wealth and 
capital accumulation, and religious and cultural dis-
semination. Akalou Wolde-Michael (1973, 10) describes 
that with Ethiopia’s colonial expansion “garrisons were 
set up all over newly acquired territories to hold down 
the conquered people. To maintain the army, part of the 
conquered land and, indeed, even the conquered people 
themselves as gabbars [semi-slaves] were assigned to the 
soldiers” and colonial o%cials. 
From these garrison centers Ethiopian soldiers and 
colonial administrators were dispatched to impose colo-
nial rule on Oromos through subjugation, enslavement, 
and expropriation of the basic means of production such 
as land, cattle, and other valuable resources. With prod-
ucts collected from Oromia and other regions, Menelik 
continuously purchased quantities of weapons and mili-
tary expertise from Europe (see Jalata 1993). Further, 
products in the form of gold, grain, cattle, honey, and 
slaves were channeled to Ethiopian colonial settlers in 
Oromian urban centers and towns. #e colonialists 
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gradually developed these urban centers into towns by 
using Oromo economic resources and labor and by build-
ing regulatory and service institutions such as o%ces, 
prisons, churches, medical and communication facili-
ties, and schools. Several non-garrison towns emerged 
in eastern and western Oromia with the development of 
trade and communication networks. As rail service was 
introduced, the towns of Aqaqi, Bisho+u, Mojo, Adama, 
Walanchiti, Metahara, Awash, Mieso, Afdem, Gota, 
Munesa, and Dire Dawa (see Map 2) &ourished.
While Oromos were evicted from their urban lands 
and forced to migrate to rural areas, Abyssinians were 
encouraged to migrate to cities and towns in Oromia. 
#ese processes were started by Menelik and have contin-
ued into the present. Menelik encouraged the migration 
of Abyssinians to the colonized areas in the late nine-
teenth century and the turn of the twentieth century. #e 
great famines in Abyssinia proper also pushed people to 
migrate to Oromia and other colonized areas (Benti, 
1988, 133). According to Charles W. McCllelan (1978, 
111-112), “Menelik’s redistribution of . . . resources had 
two major foci: one involved the movement of resources 
directly to the north [Abyssinia] for reallocation there; 
the other, the movement of needy northerners to the 
south [mainly Oromia] to be provisioned with non-
commercial resources.” To solve economic and famine 
problems in Ethiopia proper, Menelik sent a series of 
large expeditions to Oromia. Harold Marcus (1975, 
64-65) argues that “Expeditions were o+en organized 
during times of famine, when numerous refugees went 
along to settle in newly conquered lands along with the 
soldiers who stayed behind to garrison the forti!ed vil-
lages (katamas) erected as control points.” Further, the 
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domination of institutions by Habashas and the glori!-
cation of the Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity, 
and Habasha culture encouraged the migration of more 
Ethiopians to Oromian cities and towns. 
The Consequences of the 
Centralization of Habasha 
Political Power 
#e Ethiopian colonial state made Oromian cities 
and towns attractive to Ethiopians by providing them 
with land and by building churches, schools, hospitals, 
and supplying other social amenities. #ese favorable 
conditions enabled the Amharas to become the major-
ity in most cities and consider themselves as hosts, and 
Oromos as outsiders and foreigners (see O’Connor 1983, 
108). Social amenities, such as health services, trans-
portation, and communication facilities, employment 
opportunities, industries concentrated in major cities 
and urban centers. For instance, there were 93 health 
centers and 649 clinics in Addis Ababa before 1974 
(Benti 2000, 177). Menelik II Hospital was opened in 
1910, Ras Tafari Makonnen Hospital in 1922, Empress 
Zawditu Hospital and Ras Dasta Damtew Hospital in 
1931,Tesema Imperial Body Guard Hospital in1944, 
St. Paul Hospital in 1947, and Dejach Balcha Hospital 
in 1948. Omedla (police) Hospital, Takle Haimonat 
Hospital, Princess Tsehai Memorial Hospital and other 
health centers and clinics were opened and concentrated 
in the same city. In the 1990s, there were 91 hospitals, 
187 health centers, and 2,470 health stations in the 
Ethiopian Empire, and almost all of them were located 
in cities (Benti 2000, 182; Ministry of Ethiopia, 1995). 
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Oromos have been denied meaningful access to these 
hospitals and other health services, schools, colleges, and 
universities in Oromian cities and urban centers. In their 
own country and urban centers, Oromos have become 
foreigners and are even discouraged from migrating to 
larger cities (Benti 2001, 159). Oromian cities and town 
have been numerically, politically, economically, and cul-
turally dominated by Abyssinians. For instance, in 1978, 
about 59 percent of the Addis Ababa population was 
Amharas and Tigrayans, 17 percent were Oromos, 17 
percent were Gurages, cumulatively about 94 percent of 
the 1.1 million urban population (Benti 2000, 265). In 
1994, almost 58 percent of the Addis Ababa populations 
were Amhara and Tigrayans (i.e., 48.3 and 7.6 percent 
respectively) and almost 20 percent were Oromos out of 
the population of 1 million (Ethiopian Central Statisti-
cal Authority, 1994, 44). Even in the two cities, namely 
Harar and Dire Dawa, where the Oromos are almost 
the majority ethnonational group (i.e., 52.3 percent and 
48.0 percent respectively), they do not have political 
power and are denied the right to develop their institu-
tions, language and culture. #e manifestation of Oromo 
identity and language was not allowed in Oromian cities 
and towns until Oromo nationalists started to resist 
such colonial and racist policies in an organized way. 
In Oromian cities and town, the Oromo language was 
discouraged and despised and the Amharic language was 
glori!ed and became the o%cial language of the Ethio-
pian empire (see Benti 2001, 158). 
When people from di$erent parts of the world visit 
Oromian cities and towns, they don’t come into direct 
contact with the Oromo people, their culture, history 
and civilization. As Oromia was removed from the world 
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map by colonization, the Oromo people and their culture 
were removed from Oromian cities and towns through 
systematic government policies. #e Ethiopian govern-
ment made the culture and language of the Amhara the 
symbol and the de!ning trait of Ethiopian identity and 
nationalism. It prohibited the writing, broadcasting or 
speaking at public functions in the Oromo language as 
a part of its attempt to culturally assimilate the Oromo 
into the Amhara identity without structurally assimi-
lating them (see Markakis 1994, 225). #e Ethiopian 
state has been rooted in the Amhara-Tigrayan culture, 
language and Orthodox Christianity, and these char-
acteristics were re&ected in Oromian cities and towns. 
#e Abyssinian colonial settlers created two worlds in 
di$erent centers of Oromia: #e world of those who 
have socially, politically, economically, and culturally 
dominated Oromian cities and towns, and the world of 
the people who lost their country and have become mar-
ginalized and impoverished. Only a few Oromos, who 
have collaborated with the Ethiopian colonial system, 
have escaped this humiliation. #e Ethiopian govern-
ment made it a requirement that Oromos and others 
who sought “upward mobility must do so within the 
Amhara cultural framework” (Shack 1973, 276). 
Until they learned to speak Amharic, Oromos were 
denied employment in the government bureaucracy and 
the service industry (Benti 2001, 158-161). But ordinary 
Amharas and Tigrayans even without formal educa-
tion could get di$erent kinds of jobs in Oromian cities 
and towns because they spoke Amharic and they were 
members of the ethnonational group that dominated the 
institutions of government and business (Benti 2001, 
161). In the early 1960s, Girma Amare (1963, 340), an 
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Amhara bureaucrat, declared that Oromos and others 
“wishing to obtain a position in government o%ces [are] 
required to have a good command of Amharic.” More 
than 60 percent of government bureaucrats, 75 of army 
o%cers, and 70 percent of governors in the colonized 
regions were Amharas by 1974 (Michael 1989, 71). 
Most of these positions are !lled by Tigrayans today, 
since they took state power from the Amharas in 1991. 
Because the Oromos in cities and towns and rural areas 
do not have institutional and organizational control over 
their land and what they produce and their labor, they 
do not receive the bene!ts that can improve their quality 
of life. #e Oromos live under Ethiopian political repres-
sion, darkness of ignorance, and poverty.4 
Since urban areas and cities in Oromia are primar-
ily populated by Ethiopian colonial settlers and their 
collaborators, they are the ones who have access to the 
limited public facilities such as schools and hospitals. 
Oromo urbanites like their rural counterparts have 
been exposed to massive and absolute poverty and 
have been denied their fundamental human rights and 
needs that Ron Shi$man (1995, 6-8) calls subsistence, 
protection, a$ection, and understanding. Most Oromos 
in urban and rural areas have low levels of subsistence 
because they lack adequate income, enough food, and 
livable homes. #ey do not have protection from disease 
because they are denied adequate access to health and 
medical services. #ey do not have protection from 
political violence because the Ethiopian state engages 
in massive human rights violations and state terrorism 
( Jalata 2000). Oromos have been ruled by successive 
authoritarian-terrorist regimes5 which have exploited 
and impoverished them by expropriating their resources. 
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Successive Ethiopian regimes have not had any concern 
and a$ection for the Oromo people because they have 
been considered inferior people who do not deserve 
basic human rights ( Jalata 2001). Oromos have been 
denied their inalienable right to self-determination and 
democracy. #ey have been denied the right to build 
their social, economic, cultural and organizational infra-
structure. 
Without political freedom, democracy, and a legiti-
mate government, a community cannot improve its 
quality of life. People like the Oromos who do not have 
personal and public safety in their homes and communi-
ties, and who are denied the freedom of expression, asso-
ciation, and organization, are denied a good quality of 
life. In the twenty !rst century, when the world is chang-
ing quickly because of the intensi!cation of globalization, 
social revolutions, as well as revolutions in technology, 
information, communication, and transportation, the 
Oromo people are relegated to the darkness of ignorance 
and poverty. Because of the magnitude of the problems of 
the Oromo people, it is impossible to provide a numeri-
cal face to the devastating e$ects of poverty, su$ering, 
hunger, malnutrition, starvation, sickness, illiteracy and 
ignorance, alienation, and hopelessness. Because the 
majority of Oromo urbanites face these problems, they 
are underdeveloped.6 When a community or a society 
lacks independence or autonomy to determine its politi-
cal destiny through self-determination and democracy, it 
is confronted with the problems of underdevelopment, 
which is characterized as powerlessness, victimization, 
illiteracy, poverty, and other forms of socioeconomic 
crises (see Rodney 1982).
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Reaction to Political Repression in 
Urban Centers 
Beginning in the 1960s, the migration of a few 
Oromos to urban areas brought about some changes. 
#ese migrants brought the Oromo language and culture 
to Oromian cities and towns. Some Oromo elites who 
were trained to be intermediaries started to recognize 
their lack of equal citizenship rights and the mistreat-
ment of the Oromo people. Despite their individual 
achievements, these elites were given an inferior status 
to Ethiopians due to their Oromo identity. #ey started 
to form urban self-help associations because organizing a 
political party was not allowed. #ese self-help associa-
tions were united to form the Macha-Tulama Self-Help 
Association. #e formation of the Macha-Tulama Self-
Help Association in the year 1963-1964 marked the 
beginning of building urban community e$orts to solve 
Oromo problems and the public rise of Oromo nation-
alism. #e Oromo elites, by forming this association in 
Addis Ababa, started to express the collective grievances 
of the Oromo people, and to formulate programs to 
solve some economic, social and educational problems 
of Oromo society.
In May 1966, the leaders of the association at one of 
its meetings, articulated that: “(1) less than one percent 
of Oromo school age children ever get the opportunity 
to go to school; (2) . . . less than one percent of the 
Oromo population get adequate medical services; (3) . 
. . less than !+y percent of the Oromo population own 
land [currently all Oromos are landless since the Ethio-
pian state owns Oromo land]; (4) . . . a very small per-
centage of the Oromo population has access to commu-
nication services. [And yet] the Oromo paid more than 
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eighty percent of the taxes for education, health, and 
communication” (Quoted in Hassen 1998, 205-206). 
#e Ethiopian colonial state and the Ethiopian settlers 
in Oromia did not tolerate any manifestation of Oromo 
identity by either association or organization. To stop 
the development of Oromo consciousness and collective 
e$orts, the Ethiopian government banned the Macha 
and Tulama Association in 1967, killed or imprisoned its 
leaders, and prevented Oromo urbanites from organiz-
ing and developing their communities. #e banning of 
this association forced Oromo nationalism to go under-
ground. #ese events forced some Oromo nationalists to 
go underground in Oromia; others went to Somalia, the 
Middle East, and other countries to continue the Oromo 
national movement. #ey clandestinely produced politi-
cal pamphlets.7 
Conclusion
At the beginning of the twenty !rst century, in #ird 
World countries like Ethiopia, modern facilities, tech-
nologies, and public services are concentrated in cities 
and urban centers. #e intensi!cation of globalization as 
well as revolutions in transportation and communication 
technologies has allowed local and regional cities access 
to global cities and their services. #e Oromos who are 
marginalized and impoverished in their own cities and 
towns have not received adequate bene!t from the new 
technological and global changes. #e Ethiopian state 
elites and the Ethiopian urban communities in Oromia 
are determined to maintain the existing political and 
economic order by investing meager available resources 
in building unproductive institutions, such as the army, 
security infrastructure and colonial bureaucracy. #e 
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remaining economic resources are consumed or invested 
in social services that mainly bene!t the Habashas. 
Under these conditions, the chance to improve the 
quality of life through investing in Oromo communi-
ties is nonexistent. By dominating the Ethiopian politi-
cal economy and centralizing and concentrating state 
power, successive Ethiopian regimes have formulated 
and implemented policies that bene!t Habasha elites 
at the expense of Oromos and other colonized peoples. 
Ethiopian rulers, Menelik, Haile Selassie, Mengistu Haile 
Mariam, and Meles Zenawi, have caused the destruc-
tion of millions of lives to promote “their own personal 
advancement over and above the goals and aspirations of 
their followers and Ethiopians in general” (Hagos 1995, 
vii). #ese leaders have been more concerned with a 
“ferocious love of material and worldly comfort,” while 
ignoring the welfare of the people (Hagos 1995, 131). 
#ey have privatized and ethnicized public power, and 
used it for destroying rather than building a country.
#e fundamental resolution of the contradictions 
between Oromo and Habasha urban communities 
requires the implementation of the principles of self-
determination and multicultural democracy. Without 
an accountable, democratic and legitimate state, various 
population groups in Oromian cities and towns and the 
colonized regions may soon face dangerous conditions 
similar to Rwanda, Congo, and the former Yugoslavia. 
Today millions of Oromos are exposed to fatal diseases 
(including HIV/AID), famine and massive poverty 
in Oromian cities and urban centers. Since state-ter-
rorism, poverty, famine, and ethnonational challenges 
are increasing and since the major world powers have a 
role in shaping these problems, they have a moral and 
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political responsibility to become capable of mediating 
these processes and developing procedures and criteria 
by which these con&icts must be solved fairly and demo-
cratically before it is too late. On its part, while promot-
ing the principles of self-determination and democracy, 
the Oromo leadership must demonstrate that the Oromo 
people because of their democratic tradition, demo-
graphic size, geographic location, and cultural ties with 
other oppressed ethnonations can play their constructive 
role in establishing a multinational democratic society 
and in bringing a just and durable peace. Whether they 
like it or not, the fates of Oromo and Habasha urban 
communities in Oromia are interconnected. #erefore, 
these two communities should start a constructive dia-
Map 3: Modern Oromia
Source: !e Oromo Commentary 1991. Reprinted with permission.
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logue as equal partners and search for a common ground 
to work together to reorganize the existing urban politi-
cal and economic arrangements to improve the quality 
of life, social services, and community development for 
all the people without exclusion and discrimination. As 
Habasha urban communities need to dissociate them-
selves from the ethnocratic Ethiopian state, the Oromo 
urbanites need to make constant e$orts to demonstrate 
that they can democratically work with the Habasha 
communities without revenge and exclusion.
Notes
1. #ese sensitive issues have been avoided by Ethiopian 
Central Statistical Authority. Because of censorship by the 
Ethiopian government, Oromo scholars and others who 
are interested in Oromo issues cannot collect informa-
tion on the disparities in quality of life and public services 
between Oromo and Amhara communities in Oromia.
2. Naqamte was the center of gadaa at which the Leeqaa 
Oromos and their elected leaders administered their 
economic, political and religious services. It was there 
where “the gada o%cials gave justice deliberated on the 
defense of their territory and held prayers in cases of bad 
harvest ... or epidemic diseases” (Ta’a, 1994: 677). 
3. Bakare Godana chose Wacha as the place of his residence 
because of the following reasons: Waacha was rich in water 
supply since it was surrounded by streams and springs. It 
was also economically rich because it was located near the 
Handaq forest which was endowed by resources such as 
ivory, cotton, honey, and other valuable products. Waacha 
had also a strategic signi!cance since it was easy to attack 
or control the movement of the enemy from there.
4. It is super!cial to discuss about the quality of life and 
public services in Oromian cities and towns without 
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having some understanding of the general political, 
economic, and social conditions in the Ethiopian 
Empire. In the early 1990s, out of the total population 
of 53,130,780, only 7,315687 were living in urban areas 
(Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority, 1994: 41). Eco-
nomic and health indicators of Ethiopia show the sever-
ity of the hardship the powerless people like the Oromo 
face. Ethiopia is one of the three poorest countries in the 
world, and its per capita income was only 116 U. S. dollars 
in 1997. Life expectancy is only 45 years. #e mortality 
rate for children less than !ve years is 177 per 1,000 live 
births. #e infant mortality rate is 113 per 1,000 live 
births. #e maternal mortality rate is 1, 400 per 100,000 
births. Millions of people die of a simple disease because 
of lack of medical treatment. Less than half of the popula-
tion has access to basic sanitation, and only 25 percent of 
the population has access to clean water (WHO, 1998). 
HIV/AIDS is having serious negative consequences. In 
1997, 2,600,000 adults and children were infected with 
HIV/AIDS. Number of children orphaned by AIDS 
since the beginning of epidemic was 840,000. Although 
Oromos have been providing the majority of resources on 
which people in Ethiopia survive due to their numerical 
strength and abundant economic resources, such as land, 
natural resources, and labor, they do not have a reason-
able access to public facilities and institutions.
5. #e policies of the Ethiopian state are di$erent in 
Ethiopia proper and the colonized regions. #is state 
is authoritarian to Amhara and Tigrayan communities 
because it imposes dictatorship on them, and it is terror-
ist to the colonized peoples like the Oromos because it 
rules them through state-terrorism and massive human 
rights violations. 
6. #e 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia 
do not provide vital information on education, poverty 
and disease in relation to ethnonational groups.
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7. #ese pamphlets include Kana Beekta? and $e Oromos: 
Voice Against Tyranny. For the !rst time the original 
name of this people, Oromo was used in publication by 
rejecting the derogatory name, Galla.
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